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I. INTRODUCTION
Few topics have attracted as much attention within the dispute
resolution community recently as the notion of "transformative mediation."
Those who have contributed to the growing literature on the subject-
whether as proponents, critics, or both-seem to think about
"transformation" in at least two ways, both of which focus on the purposes
a mediator seeks to serve. Some, like Carrie Menkel-Meadow, think of
transformation through mediation as the "creation of more human
compassion, understanding, and moral decision making."' Others, like
Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger, seek that and something more:
"[A] change or refinement in the consciousness and character of individual
human beings.... connot[ing] individual moral development."2
Bush and Folger present their approach to transformation through
mediation in their 1994 book The Promise of Mediation.3 There they argue
that moral development requires a simultaneous "strengthening [of] the
self' and a "reaching beyond the self to relate to others," concepts they
refer to as "empowerment" and "recognition," respectively. 4 Bush and
Folger view human moral development as the primary purpose of
mediation, and they caution that their approach cannot cross-fertilize with
other approaches. If a mediator hopes to promote personal development-as
* Lecturer on Law and Climenko-Thayer Fellow, Harvard Law School; Senior
Associate, Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Weatherhead
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. I thank Jonathan Cohen, Susanne
Cook-Greuter, Marjorie Corman Aaron, Thomas Jordan, Michael Moffitt, Kathleen
Pakos, Bruce Patton, Scott Peppet, and Pamela Steiner for their helpful comments. All
errors are mine alone.
1 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of
Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 217, 236 (1995)
(reviewing ROBERT BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 24
(1994)).
2 ROBERT BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 24
(1994).
3 See id.
4 Id. at 81, 84.
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Bush and Folger believe all mediators should-then one must employ a
model that makes "empowerment" and "recognition" its exclusive
concerns.
5
Despite their emphasis on individual moral development, Bush and
Folger do not offer a comprehensive theory of human development to
support their model. As constructive-developmental psychologist Robert
Kegan explains, with the exception of organizational theorist William
Torbert,
none of the psychological approaches to conflict resolution-not the efforts
of pioneering social psychologists, nor the more recent work of the family
therapists or the organization developmentalists-attend to the individual's
development of consciousness. As a result, none of these theorist-
practitioners is in a position to consider the demands their respective
curricula make on mental capacity or to assess a person's readiness to
engage their designs. 6
This Article is an initial effort to assess, from a constructive-
developmental perspective, the ability of Bush and Folger's model to
5 See id. at 108-11.
6 ROBERT KEGAN, IN OVER OUR HEADS: THE MENTAL DEMANDS OF MODERN LIFE
321 (1994) [hereinafter KEGAN, IN OVER OUR HEADS]. As discussed more fully below,
Bush and Folger describe three distinct moral frameworks (or worldviews) upon which
they consider various competing models of mediation to be based. BUSH & FOLGER,
supra note 2, at 242-44; see also Joseph Folger & Robert Baruch Bush, Ideology,
Orientations to Conflict, and Mediation Discourse, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN MEDIATION:
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH AND PERSPECTIVES 3, 19-21 (Joseph P. Folger & Tricia S.
Jones eds., 1994). Their own model flows from a moral framework they call
"relational." See id. Bush and Folger situate the work of developmental psychologist
Carol Gilligan within their relational paradigm. Their model's dual emphasis on
"empowerment" and "recognition" appears to be a direct outgrowth of Gilligan's
vision of adult maturity, which values both autonomy and connection. See CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 151-74 (1993). Bush and Folger make only fleeting
references to Gilligan, who seems to be their only source for developmental theory. See
BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 2, at 233. It is well known, however, that GiUigan has not
provided a comprehensive theory of development over the lifespan, as Kegan has done.
See generally, e.g., JOANN WOLSKI CONN, SPIRITUALITY AND PERSONAL MATURIrY
(1989). Kegan's model of lifespan development considers the benefits and burdens of
both autonomy and connection at each stage of development. See generally ROBERT
KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF: PROBLEM AND PROCESS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1982)
[hereinafter KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF]. Kegan thus avoids Kohlberg's neglect of
connection and privileging of autonomy, which Gilligan is famous for having called to
our attention.
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promote individual moral development. Putting aside for the time being
important questions about the purposes of mediation,7 I ask instead, "How
well does transformative mediation serve its express goal of promoting
human moral development?"
I focus on Bush and Folger's model for two reasons. First, as
mentioned earlier, Bush and Folger's transformative aspirations appear to
be more ambitious than those of many others who seek some form of
individual or relational "transformation" through mediation. As explained
more fully below, if Bush, Folger, and others truly hope to promote
individual moral development as their primary purpose, as opposed to (or in
addition to) more civil and integrative resolutions of isolated disputes, their
models should be informed by a theory of human development that covers
the entire lifespan, and their practices should be responsive to the particular
developmental resources and limitations of the specific parties whom they
seek to assist. Second, Bush and Folger's approach has become the most
widely discussed and practiced form of mediation aimed principally at
altering relationships and self-understandings, as opposed to "solving the
problem" by reaching agreement. 8 Given the growing popularity of their
approach, particularly among practitioners, it is important that those who
make use of it appreciate its potential limitations.
Part II of this Article is devoted to a general discussion of constructive-
developmental psychology and the three most common stages of adult
development, as described by Robert Kegan, constructive-
developmentalism's leading theorist, and his colleagues. In Part III, I offer
a reformulation of the concept of "transformation" in relation to mediation
efforts intended to promote individual development. I describe Bush and
Folger's approach to mediation in greater detail in Part IV, analyzing it
from a constructive-developmental perspective. My goal is to determine the
7 With respect to the question of mediation's goals and purposes, as well as Bush
and Folger's social program, I am in essential agreement with the views expressed by
Carrie Menkel-Meadow in her 1995 review of The Promise of Mediation. See generally
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1. In particular, I believe "transformative" purposes-
including mediator moves and responses that tend to support a party's ongoing
development-often can mix fruitfully with problem solving and other purposes. In
fact, the types of activities typically associated with problem solving mediation are
essential to development for some parties. As a result, a mediator who has no particular
"transformative" objectives-or who even rejects the notion that moral development
can or should be an important purpose of mediation-may nonetheless unwittingly
provide support for the ongoing development of some parties. This topic is discussed
more fully below.
8 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 2, at 2.
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"transformative potential" of their approach in light of the mental demands
it makes upon disputants. I conclude that Bush and Folger's model-at least
as it presently is conceived-is no more supportive of individual moral
development than the most common form of what Bush and Folger refer to
as "problem-solving mediation." 9 But, my intention is to be constructive
and not merely critical. As I discuss in Part V below, an appreciation of the
dynamics of human development may increase a mediator's efficacy,
regardless of his espoused orientation to practice. In Part VI, the final Part,
I briefly discuss two significant impediments to use of constructive-
developmental theory in mediation practice.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY
Constructive-developmental psychology is an empirically-supported l
theory of human development. It focuses on the underlying motion and
logic of development, thereby providing insight into a wide spectrum of
human experience. Its tap root is the pioneering work of the late biologist-
philosopher Jean Piaget, whose primary interests were the cognitive and
moral development of children. 11
In one of his most famous experiments, Piaget asked children of
different ages to pour a quantity of liquid from a tall, thin beaker into a
short, fat beaker. When asked which beaker contained (or had contained)
the greater quantity of liquid, younger children pointed to the tall beaker.
Older children knew that the amount of liquid remains constant, regardless
of the size and shape of its container. Piaget's experiment vividly
confirmed what many parents and school teachers already know: children
make sense of their experience in increasingly complex and subtle ways as
they develop. 12 Piaget ultimately identified a series of childhood and
adolescent stages of development, each representing a qualitatively
different, and progressively more sophisticated, way of making sense out of
9 See id. at 55-77. My conclusions are not the product of empirical research,
though presumably they could be tested using the research methodology developed by
Kegan and his colleagues. See generally LISA LAHEY ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE SUBJECT-
OBJECT INTERVIEW: ITS ADMINISTRATION AND INTERPRETATION (1988).
10 See discussion infra note 20.
11 See generally JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1948)
[hereinafter PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGEMENT OF THE CHILD]; JEAN PIAGET, THE
ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN (1952) [hereinafter PIAGET, THE ORIGINS OF
INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN].
12 See KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF, supra note 6, at 28.
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one's experience. 13 Lawrence Kohlberg, one of Piaget's students, extended
Piaget's work in the realm of moral development, adding to it the study of
adult moral development. 14
Kohlberg's student Robert Kegan, building upon the work of Piaget,
Kohlberg, and others, constructed a developmental theory that covers the
entire lifespan. Prior to the publication of Kegan's work and that of a
handful of others, there had been relatively little recognition of the fact that
adults may undergo qualitative psychological transformations
postadolescence. The changes that occur in adulthood traditionally
were thought to be of a different order, nonregular, and essentially
derivative of the fundamental psychological work of earlier years. It is
probably safe to say that this is no longer the predominant view of
psychological adulthood. While there will always be controversy
regarding the role of early experience in the present, and no one suggests
there is not enormous variation- in possible life courses, there is an
emerging picture of adulthood continuing a lifelong history of qualitative
psychological organizations which, underneath the surface variety, have
remarkable regularities. 15
Kegan's theory, unlike others, 16 focuses on the underlying motion of
development. It views developmental progress in adulthood as the product
of a variety of conditions, experiences, and influences, rather than being
strictly determined by age or other invariable characteristics. 17 This makes
it well suited for use in assessing the extent to which a given conflict
resolution process supports a person's ongoing development. If one
believes, for instance, that developmental progress is age-determined, there
13 See PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGEMENT OF THE CHILD, supra note 11, at 29-50.
14See generally LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, COLLECTED PAPERS ON MORAL
DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL EDUCATION (1975); Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and
Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF
SOCIALIZATION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 347 (David A. Goslin ed., 1969); Lawrence
Kohlberg & R. Kramer, Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral
Development, 12 HuM. DEv. 93 (1969).
15 Robert Kegan & Lisa Laskow Lahey, Adult Leadership and Adult Development:
A Constructivist View, in LEADERSHIP: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 199, 200
(Barbara Kellerman ed:, 1984).
16 Age oriented, or phasic, theories are among the most prominent competing
theories of adult development. See generally DANIEL J. LEVINSON, THE SEASONS OF A
MAN's LIFE (1978).
17 See Kegan & Lahey, supra note 15, at 200-02.
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is little point in asking whether and how one approach to mediation might
promote development relative to another.
Constructive-developmentalism charts at least five successive stages of
development-the "qualitative psychological organizations" referred to
above in the quoted material. The vast majority of adults occupy one of the
later three stages, or are transitioning between two of them.1 8 The theory
encompasses not only the realms of cognition and moral reasoning, but also
affect. 19 During the past twenty years, Kegan, his colleagues, and others
have conducted numerous longitudinal studies of adults in a variety of
contexts. This research has produced a rich topography of three of the
potential stages of adult development and of the transitions between them.20
18 See KEGAN, IN OVER OUR HEADS, supra note 6, at 187-97.
19 See KEGAN, THE EvOLVING SELF, supra note 6, at 15.
20 1 say potential stages of adult development because Kegan's and others' research
indicates that progress along the developmental continuum is not automatic or
guaranteed. And, in contrast to the childhood transitions, there are no easily specifiable
age norms for the adult developmental transitions. Most people begin to construct their
experience at the first of these stages of development, the "interpersonal stage," during
adolescence. This stage of development may persist into (or, in a relatively small
number of cases, only be reached in) chronological adulthood. Research suggests that,
at present, approximately 14% of U.S. adults are at the interpersonal stage of
development. This same research indicates that approximately 32% of adults are
navigating the shift from the interpersonal stage to the next stage of development, the
"institutional stage." The institutional stage accounts for about 34% of all adults.
Another six percent are transitioning from the institutional stage to the final stage in
Kegan's model, the "interindividual stage," which an even smaller number of adults
actually have reached. See KEGAN, IN OVER OUR HEADS, supra note 6, at 192-93; see
also discussion infra Part II.A (discussing these three stages of development). There is
evidence of further stages of adult development. See, e.g., Susanne R. Cook-Greuter,
Rare Forms of Self-understanding In Mature Adults, in TRANSCENDENCE AND MATURE
THOUGHT IN ADULTHOOD 119 (Melvin E. Miller & Susanne R. Cook-Greuter eds.,
1994). Given the comparatively small number of adults who are fully settled in the
interindividual stage of development, as well as their facility for coping constructively
with conflict, I have focused my discussion on the first two stages of adult development
identified by Kegan. I also have chosen not to address issues related to the relatively
small number of adults-no more than about 13% according to various studies-that
have not yet reached the interpersonal stage of development. See KEGAN, IN OVER OUR
HEADS, supra note 6, at 193.
I have no information about the racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, or other
demographic stratifications represented in these studies, other than awareness that the
gender mix was approximately 67% female and 33% male. See id. Factors like race
and income may have an important influence on individuals' access to contexts and
experiences, like higher education, that may be supportive of their development,
[Vol. 15:1 1999]
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As explained in detail below,- each of these stages amounts to a
qualitatively different way of understanding, or "making meaning" about,
oneself in relation to others.21 Constructive-developmentalism is not as
concerned with what one knows as it is with the preconscious organizing
principles that condition how one makes sense out of what one experiences
and knows.22 It is "constructive" because it is concerned with the ways that
people are predisposed to think and feel about their diverse experiences and
perceptions; that is, how they organize them into a meaningful whole. 23 In
a sense, constructive-developmentalism attempts to "map the maps" by
which people make sense out of their experience (which, of course,
influences the types of experiences they seek and avoid). It is
"developmental" because it recognizes that the ways people make meaning,
as well as the behaviors that flow from these ways of making meaning, are'
susceptible to ongoing transformation. 24
Constructive-developmentalism is not simply describing individual
variations in intelligence, styles, preferences, or similar characteristics. To
make an imperfect analogy to computers, the capabilities of a particular
configuration of hardware limit both the types and amount of data a
computer can process and the ways in which it can organize, or "make
sense" out of, that data. Within its limitations, the computer can "learn" to
perform new tasks by being provided with new instructions in the form of
new or revised operating instructions (programs). There are some
instructions that the computer is incapable of executing-some software
exceeds the hardware's capabilities-but the computer's limitations are not
a problem so long as the demands placed on it do not exceed those
limitations. Problems arise, however, when users demand that the computer
perform in ways that it neither can perform, nor learn to perform.
Constructive-developmental psychology holds that individuals labor
under similar limitations, including limitations on the ways one is able to
construct-or make sense of-one's interaction with others. And, while
most people (unlike most computers) can learn, they frequently learn
slowly and with great difficulty, particularly when the learning required is
including development past the interpersonal stage. Accordingly, the statistics set forth
above may not be representative of developmental stratification among adults in the
United States, where the studies were conducted.
21 See Kegan & Lahey, supra note 15, at 202-05.
22 See id. at 202.
23 See id. at 202-03.
24 See id. at 203.
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the acquisition of an entirely new way of understanding oneself and making
sense out of one's experiences.2 5
These developmental limitations, have important consequences for
conflict management. Research by constructive-developmental theorists
provides insight into individuals' experiences of conflict and their internal
resources for dealing with it at each developmental stage. This research is
significant because it can help conflict resolution theorists and practitioners
understand the psychological resources and limitations people bring to a
given conflict-and to any process designed to contribute to its resolution.
Adults in conflict may be employing one or more qualitatively different,
developmentally conditioned ways of making sense of their interactions, all
without any awareness that this is occurring.
A. Three Stages of Adult Development
What is the interior landscape of each adult stage of development and
how are we to understand the transitions between them? As Kegan and
Lahey explain, "[d]evelopment is always a process of outgrowing one
system of meaning by integrating it (as a subsystem) into a new system of
meaning. What was 'the whole' becomes 'part' of a new whole." 26 The
transition from one stage to the next occurs as one's current way of
understanding oneself and one's experiences-that is, the way of making
meaning one presently is preconsciously subject to-progressively becomes
an object on which one can reflect.27 These transitions typically occur
slowly and often painfully as one confronts and becomes increasingly
conscious of the fact that one's existing way of understanding oneself, and
thus one's way of relating to others and functioning in the world, are
inadequate to the demands made by life's circumstances and others with
whom one relates.28 When the transition from one stage to the next is
complete, one enjoys a new sense of agency because one is free from
psychological constraints and predispositions that flow from the prior
meaning system's limitations. In effect, one acquires a new self before
which the demands and dilemmas of the old self can be brought for
resolution.
25 See KEGAN, IN OVER OuR HEADS, supra note 6, at 187-88.
26 Kegan & Lahey, supra note 15, at 203.
27 See Robert Kegan et al., The Psychologic of Emotion: A Neo-Piagetian View, in
EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 105, 114 (Dante Cicchetti & Petra Hesse eds., 1982).
28 See KEGAN, IN OVER OUR HEADS, supra note 6, at 187-88.
[Vol. 15:1 1999]
HOW TRANSFORMATIVE IS TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION?
The remainder of this Part consists of brief descriptions of the three
most common stages of adult development, including 'some of the
implications of each for an individual's experience of conflict. These
descriptions present "pure types," and the reader should bear in mind that
many adults are transitioning between two of these stages at any given
moment. Those undergoing a transition between stages are, to varying
degrees, less subject to the prior stage's limitations and more possessed of
the subsequent stage's strengths than someone fully embedded in the prior
stage. These brief descriptions fall short of capturing the full richness and
complexity with which constructive-developmental psychology presently is
capable of describing adult experience, but they should provide a sufficient
basis for tentatively assessing the ways in which Bush and Folger's
approach to mediation may and may not be capable of contributing to adult
moral development. The first two stages of adult development described
below tend towards opposite ends of a continuum. Individuals at one end of
the continuum are over identified with others; at the other end, a person's
ego boundaries are comparatively rigid and well-guarded. Thus, the
hallmark of the interpersonal stage of development is an embeddedness in
one's relationships and a corresponding inability to think and act with
genuine autonomy. An individual at the interpersonal stage relies greatly on
others' approval or disapproval in decisionmaking and, more generally, in
his or her own self-assessment. The hallmark of the institutional stage of
development is the very autonomy that the interpersonal self lacks. And, as
we shall see, the tension between identification with others and
differentiation from them is largely resolved at the interindividual stage of
development. Table 1, below, summarizes each of the three stages.
1. The Interpersonal Stage
After three long mediation sessions, Karen and Jim had discussed their
most important concerns and feelings about their pending divorce. They had
explored many possibilities for resolution of the contested issues that the
court will decide if they cannot reach an agreement-child custody,
property division, taxes, alimony, and support. Near the end of the present
session, Karen makes a settlement offer that she believes strikes a fair
balance between their respective needs and concerns. Jim acknowledges
that Karen's offer reflects the consensus that has been developing between
them, but he is paralyzed by indecision. Turning to the mediator, Jim says,
"I guess this is fair. I just don't know what to do. What do you think I
should do? If you think it makes sense, I'll go with it."
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Mediators who handle disputes between individuals-particularly
individuals unrepresented by counsel-are frequently faced with requests
like Jim's. There are many possible reasons for his request. We might, for
example, expect a party with little awareness of standards of fairness
commonly used to resolve the distributive issues in divorce negotiations to
seek this information when evaluating a settlement offer. Many experienced
divorce mediators would be well-positioned to provide this information.
But, Jim appears to be seeking more than information from the mediator.
He seems to want to defer to the mediator's judgment-to have the
mediator make the decision for him. Many adults faced with such a major
decision at a traumatic moment like this one would feel a similar impulse.
Yet, many of these same adults would not be content, in the final analysis,
to defer to another's judgment. Jim's seeming inability to be the author of
his own life at this critical moment typifies one of the principal limitations
experienced by many adults at the interpersonal stage of development.
An adult at the interpersonal stage of development is attuned to others
in a way that a child (or adolescent) at the immediately prior stage of
development is not. Children and adolescents who have not reached the
interpersonal stage of development are unreflectively (and therefore totally)
identified with, or subject to, their own needs, desires, and purposes. 29
Prior to the interpersonal stage, children and adolescents are capable of
pursuing their own objectives, but they are incapable of genuinely
integrating them with others' objectives. When their objectives align with
others' objectives, cooperation is possible; when they do not, tantrums and
adolescent resistance result. 30
Growth to the interpersonal stage of development, which typically
begins in adolescence and can continue into late adulthood, removes this
obstacle to interpersonal coordination. One can now consider and attune
oneself to others' perspectives, which affords one a greater sense of social
integration. The ability to experience others as something more than
obstacles or means to the fulfillment of one's own purposes is a definite
strength of interpersonalism, as it enables the synchronization of one's
needs, desires, and purposes with others'. 31
But, as with the other developmental stages, the interpersonal stage's
primary limitation is the flip side of its principal strength. An adult at the
interpersonal stage of development, in a very real sense, is her
29 See Kegan & Lahey, supra note 15, at 203.
30 See id.
31 See id.
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relationships. Just as the individual at the prior stage is embedded in, and
therefore cannot take a perspective on, her needs, desires, and purposes,
the adult at the interpersonal stage of development is embedded in her
relationships. One is incapable of gaining distance from them and thus lacks
the ability effectively to regulate the conflicting demands made by the
various participants in what amounts to an internal conversation comprised
of the others' voices that have become one's own.32 At the interpersonal
stage, "[o]ne's self-definitions, purposes, and preoccupying concerns are
essentially co-defined, co-determined, and co-experienced. " 33, As a result,
an adult at the interpersonal stage of development is likely to be highly
reliant upon the perspectives of others in matters both personal and
professional, whether the others merit such reliance or not. In short, the
interpersonal self lacks sufficient agency to think and act with genuine
independence. 34 This may explain why Jim, in the example above, turns to
the mediator seeking direction about what to do.
An adult at the interpersonal stage of development is essentially unable
to differentiate himself fully from his social surround. One naturally knows
that one exists as a separate person, but one is highly dependent upon
others' approval or disapproval for one's own sense of self. In effect, one
is "made up by" one's relationships. And, the interpersonal self often is
most influenced by those relationships which arise out of the sharing of
physical space. 35 While one may be able to remain loyal to people not
immediately present-assuming, that is, that the absent parties are people
with whom one has significant face-to-face contact-relationships with
those in one's immediate presence, like a mediator and other parties to a
mediation, are powerfully influential. People at the interpersonal stage of
development often appear to be indecisive, impressionable, or to lack self-
esteem.
An adult at the interpersonal stage of development can internalize
others' competing feelings and perspectives from context to context, but she
lacks the ability to resolve inconsistencies among them.
[The interpersonal self's] ambivalences or personal conflicts are not
really conflicts between what I want and what someone else wants. When
looked into they regularly turn out to be conflicts between what I want to
do as a part of this shared reality and what I want to do as a part of that
32 See id. at 203-04.
33 Id. at 203.
34 See id. at 203-04.
35 See KEGAN, THE EvOLviNG SELF, supra note 6, at 58.
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shared reality. To ask someone in this evolutionary balance to resolve
such a conflict by bringing both shared realities before herself is to name
precisely the limits of this way of making meaning. "Bringing before
oneself' means not being subject to it, being able to take it as an object,
just what this balance cannot do. 36
An adult at the interpersonal stage of development may be highly adept
at emphatically considering and relating to others' feelings and
perspectives, yet this very ability can create an internal conflict that may be
very difficult or impossible for one to resolve independently. An adult at
this stage of development can "be aware of shared feelings, agreements,
and expectations that take primacy over individual interests," 37 but he
cannot stand apart from his relationships in order to regulate them or to
regulate the "relationships between relationships." 38 Adults at this stage of
development may have great difficulty articulating and asserting "their
own" interests and perspectives, because their interests and perspectives are
not fully self-originating, but largely received from others. In the example
above, Jim may be unable to resolve the conflicting claims he feels are
made upon him by his (soon-to-be former) wife, children, and perhaps
others (e.g., parents or close friends). The deference he shows the mediator
may be an effort to enlist an external authority to help him resolve his inner
conflict.
2. The Institutional Stage
Susan and Mike are business partners whose personal and professional
animosities are threatening to capsize a lucrative enterprise that they have
built over many years. They agreed to hire a mediator to help them try to
resolve their differences before dissolving their partnership. After an initial
period of sometimes heated exchange about past events, and much
reciprocal perspective-taking that was encouraged by the mediator in joint
and private sessions, Susan says, "Okay, Mike, now I understand how you
see things and you understand how I see them. We each have our point of
view, and now I understand yours much better. But, if we're going to get
anywhere, we're going to have to find some way to satisfy your priorities
and mine, because it's clear that neither one of us is going to give in to the
other. "
36 1d. at 96.
37 See id.
38 See id.
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Adults at the institutional stage of development have emerged from a
heavy dependence upon others for their self-definition and therefore enjoy a
high degree of autonomy and self-expression; 39 In the example above,
Susan is still able to "get inside" Mike's perspective-each successive stage
retains the competencies enjoyed at the prior stage-but Mike's perspective
is no longer inside her. She can take Mike's perspective while separating
herself from it. The shift from the interpersonal to the institutional stage
involves the gradual emergence from an (unperceived) experience of
oneself as one's relationships toward a self-authoring perspective in which
one now has relationships.40 It entails the progressive relativization of
others' expectations in favor of "an emerging orientation toward
considering 'what it is I want' independent of'others' expectations." 41
Thus, an adult at the institutional stage of development can reliably identify
and assert his own interests in a way that adults at the interpersonal stage
cannot.
Once the shift from the interpersonal stage to the institutional stage is
complete, one is able to regulate the competing interpersonal demands and
commitments that previously defined oneself.
The person becomes more self-authoring, self-owning, self-dependent,
more autonomous-not in the sense of more isolated or separated but in
the literal sense of "autonomy," self-naming. Rather than having the
pieces of oneself co-owned and co-determined in various shared
psychological contexts, the person brings the power of determination into
the self and establishes the self as a kind of psychic "institution," an
organization which the self is now responsible for running and regulating.
In common language, the person evolves an identity42
The institutional stage has obvious strengths. The ability to mediate
among interpersonal demands and commitments gives rise to a truly
meaningful sense of agency. The institutional self may choose to involve
others (whether friends, family, colleagues, or "experts") in its meaning
making, but this is truly a choice. One can decide and act independently;
one no longer looks of necessity to others when crafting one's "own"
perspectives. Susan, in the example with which this subpart begins, would
not attempt to delegate her decisionmaking authority to the mediator in the
39 See Kegan & Lahey, supra note 15, at 204.
40 See id.
41 Kegan et al., supra note 27, at 114.
42 Kegan & Lahey, supra note 15, at 204.
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way that Jim attempts to do in the prior example. And, because an adult at
the institutional stage of development is capable of regulating the interplay
between her various relationships and roles, she also exhibits a level of
continuity and stability in self-understanding and self-presentation from
context to context that an adult at the interpersonal stage lacks. 43
Despite its strengths relative to the interpersonal stage, the institutional
stage also has limitations. An adult at the institutional stage of development
is vulnerable to whatever threatens his autonomy and self-control. 44 One is
paradoxically enslaved to one's own autonomy and unable to reflect
meaningfully on the purposes for which that autonomy is being exercised.
One's overriding concern is the satisfaction of one's own interests, even if
one's interests are highly other-focused.
An adult at the institutional stage of development is beholden to a
personal "ideology"-a framework one uses to interpret and evaluate one's
social world and to which one thinks the world should conform. Despite
one's increased autonomy in relation to those at the interpersonal stage of
development, adults at the institutional stage have no ability to think and act
autonomously with respect to their "ideologies," despite their awareness of
competing frameworks. An adult at this stage of development does not
necessarily think of herself as ideological. Indeed, it is possible to construct
an identity around an ethic of tolerance and flexibility, in which case one
likely will be intolerant of those who are intolerant and inflexible, all the
while failing to see the irony of this stance. 45
The institutional "ideology" may take the form of a self-conscious
identification with a conventional scientific, economic, social, or religious
worldview. But, it also could be a unique mix of commitments that are
peculiar to the individual or shared with a small, informal group of cohorts
and which have little relation to wider societal norms and perspectives. One
may be extremely challenged when confronted with a perspective that is not
aligned with one's own ideology, particularly when persuasive efforts fail
(perhaps because the competing perspective is one held by another adult at
the institutional stage of development). Having won a hard-fought battle to
43 See KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF, supra note 6, at 226-27.
44 If this sounds a bit like the consciousness of the preinterpersonal, school age
child, that is because the various stages alternate back and forth between a tendency
toward over differentiation, on the one hand, and over inclusion, on the other, albeit
with significantly diminishing degrees of intensity as one further develops. For a
helpful discussion of this aspect of the developmental progression, see KEGAN, THE
EVOLVING SELF, supra note 6, at 108-10.
45 See Kegan et al., supra note 27, at 115.
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forge an independent self capable of regulating the competing demands of
interpersonalism-creating, in essence, an internal institution, or order, to
regulate those demands-one holds on to that order firmly.
Adults at the institutional stage of development seek, in the first
instance, to resolve conflict on terms that leave their "ideologies"
unaffected. People are viewed as relatively fixed and unchangeable, and
their interests concrete, discretely identifiable, and portable from context to
context. Conflict is viewed as a problem external to the relationship among
the parties, as a "thing" to be solved-preferably through others'
acquiescence, but through compromise where necessary. When
compromise is accepted, an adult at the institutional stage of development
may view a good resolution as one in which all parties "win" to the
maximum extent possible in light of the parties' finite resources, relatively
fixed interests, and any value-creating possibilities presented by the
conflict. In economic terms, such a resolution is said to be "maximally
efficient" or "Pareto optimal."46 A cooperative relationship among parties
in conflict is one in which they seek to capitalize on complimentary
differences and distribute the resources available for trade fairly.
Kegan illustrates how we might expect two institutional marital partners
to speak about their differences:
[O]ur differences are one of the great strengths of our marriage.
We... have developed a lot of respect for each other's way of looking at
and relating to the world....
... We find that our differences are often complementary.... Yes,
we still fight sometimes. We don't always listen or consider that there
might actually be a whole different take on a matter besides our own that
also makes sense.... But more often the fights lead to a better result.
They make one or both of us come over and take a look from the other
one's point of view, and we see that there's a good reason why it looks
different to the other one. We are a good problem-solving team.... We
compromise. We take turns. And sometimes we even find a way to create
a solution that includes a lot of both of our views. We stopped trying to
get the other person to change a long time ago. We are who we
are.... Our differences are an asset for the most part.
4 6 See HowARD RAiFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION: HOW TO
RESOLVE CONFuIcTs AND GET TnE BEsT OUT OF BARGANNG 235-50 (1982). Parties at
the interindividual stage also may seek Pareto optimal results, but the Pareto frontier-
the curve defined by all possible Pareto optimal outcomes-is much more robust for
these individuals, because their interests are less fixed and the parties are better able to
synchronize them.
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Not every problem has a solution, either, and sometimes you just
have to live with that. That goes with the territory of two strong people
with minds of their own. 47
There is nothing wrong with this hypothetical couple's experience. They
appear to be quite satisfied with their marriage. But, there are limits to the
couple's ability to manage conflict, as they themselves acknowledge. Their
"creative solutions" satisfy "a lot," but not all, of their interests. And,
"sometimes [they] just have to live with" the fact that some problems
cannot be "solved."
3. The Interindividual Stage
Wendy and Carrie, women in their 50s, are among a small number of
participants in a facilitated dialogue on abortion. Both women are long-
time activists, though on opposing sides of the debate. Having thoughi-ully
listened to Wendy and several others who share Wendy's views, Carrie
acknowledges her growing ambivalence about the way the debate is framed
and carried out. "I used to be so certain that we were 100% right and you
were 100% wrong. Now I'm not so sure 'right v. wrong' is the best way to
look at the issue. I mean, there are at least two rights here-respect for life
and respect for personal autonomy-and recently I find myself deeply
moved by stories on both sides of the divide. I personally don't know
anymore what I'd think or do if I-or, God forbid, one of my daughters-
were faced with an unwanted pregnancy. And, I'm beginning to think that
the 'answer' to the broader social question doesn't lie in an 'either/or'
solution. I don't yet know what 'the answer'-or answers-will be, but I
don't think it should be the product of yet another lawsuit or some grudging
compromise. Maybe we don't need an official 'pronouncement' at all, but
some changed vision of what the issue is all about, together with ways to
collaborate to address it. But what we need more than anything, I suspect,
is some new way of understanding what we-I mean all of us-are about in
relation to 'the problem.'"
The shift from the institutional stage of development to -the
interindividual stage involves the progressive loss of the self-constructed as
a unified and coherent institution. The institution and its ideology are in the
process of being revitalized in favor of an emerging self-system that
ultimately will be capable of genuine critical reflection upon both the
47 KEGAN, IN OVER OuR HEADS, supra note 6, at 308.
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institution and its ideology. With it will come the ability to decide and act
in contravention of the former ideology in order to serve superordinate
moral principles. If one's moral judgment should coincide with the
purposes suggested by the former self s ideology, one certainly could
choose to act in accordance with that ideology. But, this truly is a choice.
The institutional order thus becomes one "system" alongside others that an
adult at the interindividual stage of development is capable of containing,
evaluating, and mediating among. 48 As the above example suggests, an
ardent "pro-life" or "pro-choice" activist transitioning to the interindividual
stage might begin to find herself more open and sensitive to the full moral,
psychological, and socioeconomic complexity attending the abortion debate,
as well as the full diversity of (sometimes contradictory) views within
herself. She might begin to acknowledge corners of herself that resonate,
however slightly, with perspectives she formerly dismissed. This shift
implies a radical loss of certitude about things previously taken for granted
(e.g., roles and duties). It signals the loss of the clearly-defined and well-
bounded identity that formerly provided one's sense of self.
No longer subject to the institutional self s exclusive investment in a
particular ideology, the interindividual self is able to coordinate among a
multitude of systems of meaning, both internally and interpersonally. And,
[t]he capacity to coordinate the institutional permits one now to join others
not as fellow-instrumentalists[, as is typical of the preinterpersonal stage,]
nor as loyalists[, as is typical of the institutional stage], but as
individuals-people who are known ultimately in relation to their actual or
potential recognition of themselves and others as value-originating,
system-generating, history-making individuals. The community is for the
first time a "universal" one in that all persons, by virtue of their being
persons, are eligible for membership. The group which this self knows as
"its own" is not a pseudo-species, but the species. One's self is no longer
limited to the mediation and control of the interpersonal (the self as an
institution) but expands to mediate one's own and others' "institutions." If
the construction of the self as an institution brought the interpersonal
"into" the self, the new construction brings the self back into the
interpersonal. The great difference between this and [the interpersonal
stage] is that there now is a "self" to be brought to, rather than derived
from, others; where [the interpersonal stage involves] a fused
48 See KEGAN, THE EvOLVING SELF, supra note 6, 118-20.
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commingling [the interindividual stage is characterized by] a commingling
which guarantees distinct identities.4 9
The ego boundaries of an adult at the interindividual stage of
development now are more fluid and permeable but without threat of loss
of one's own identity through over-identification with others. One becomes
aware of, and even finds strength in, one's own incompleteness, including
the failure of one's existing perspectives and preferences adequately to
account for the full range of one's own and others' experiences. One is
open to, and even welcomes, experiences that expose, and facilitate
correction or expansion of, one's present perspectives and preferences. One
becomes capable of a level of interpersonal attunement and genuine,
nonjudgmental curiosity in social encounters that an adult at the institutional
stage of development lacks, because defense of one's ego boundaries is an
end in itself.
An adult at the interindividual stage of development is also able to
relativize, and thus evaluate, the assumptions, values, and historical and
cultural circumstances that underlie the institutional ideology. This does not
imply a lack of moral fortitude or an inability to thoughtfully discriminate
among competing choices. 50 Indeed, one has greater moral agency, because
one now may choose to serve moral principles that do not accord with
one's former ideological biases. The institutional ideology now can be
viewed and treated as one meaning making system among others. To say
that the institutional ideology is relativized is not to say, however, that it
necessarily is disregarded. In most cases, it will remain an important source
of meaning. As Kegan explains, "[t]he hallmark of every rebalancing is that
the past, which may during transition be repudiated, is not finally rejected
but reappropriated." 51 One's relationship to the institutional system of
meaning changes. The maintenance of the system is no longer an end in
itself. Thus, one has a new ability to bring inside oneself, incorporate, and
coordinate among meaning systems that one previously could understand on
a cognitive level, but which one could not possibly embrace.
One's conception of self and other is no longer dichotomous, but
dialogical-not self/other (implying sharp division), but self-and-other
(interpenetrating; distinct but not separate). The defining characteristic of
one's understanding of the self and other is reciprocity.
49 Id. at 104-05.
50 See KEGAN, IN OVER OUR HEADS, supra note 6, at 331.
51 KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF, supra note 6, at 104.
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Reciprocity now becomes a matter of at once mutually preserving the
other's distinctness while interdependently fashioning a bigger context in
which these separate identities interpenetrate, by which the separate
identities are co-regulated, and to which persons invest an affection
supervening their separate identities.52
Thus, an anthropologist at the interindividual stage of development
would be unlikely, to conceive of her task simply as "me reporting on the
host culture from the perspective of my own," all the while maintaining
sharp distinctions between "the host culture" and "my own,"3 "my hosts"
and "me." She would not observe local custom or participate in rituals
merely out of respect or with an academic curiosity the main purpose of
which is to discern what meaning others may see in them (as important as
both these motivations might continue to be). She also would be open to
what meaning might exist there for her-how the ways others make
meaning might be incorporated into her own meaning making. She would
be attentive to the ways in which these experiences permeate and affect her
own sense of self. And, we might expect whatever new self-understanding
she arrives at to be reflected in her account of her research. Just as a
physicist cannot observe an event without altering it, so the anthropologist
at the interindividual stage of development cannot interact with a culture-
whether around the globe or around the corner-without the prospect of it
altering her. The other culture remains "other" in the sense of being
distinct, but it is no longer other in the sense of being fully separate. 53
For the adult at the interindividual stage of development, conflict
suggests that one may be holding on too tightly to a cherished perspective,
as illustrated by another of Kegan's hypothetical marital discourses:
When we're at our very best .... we are able to stop pretending that [our]
differences and opposites can only be found in the other person, or that
the battles we get into are only with the other person. We realize that this
polarizing or dichotomizing serves a purpose for each of us, and we are
less enamored with that purpose. We see it's not the whole truth.
When we are at our best, we get a good glimpse at the fact that the
activist, for example, also has a contemplative living inside him. The one
who is strict with the kids has a part of herself that has a whole other,
looser way of feeling about them. .. . [O]ur favorite fights are the ones in
which we don't try to solve the conflicts but let the conflicts "solve us,"
52 Id. at 253-54.
53 This example is adapted from an example that Kegan uses in his Harvard class
on adult development.
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you could say. We mean by that that if a conflict doesn't go away after a
while we've found it's a good bet that one of us, or both of us, has gotten
drawn back into being too identified with our more comfortable position.
Like the end we're holding onto so passionately is our whole story, our
whole truth in the matter. When we can get out of the grip of our more
familiar side then the fight doesn't feel as if the other one is trying to
make us give up anything. The fight becomes a way for us to recover our
own complexity, so to speak, to leave off making the other into our
opposite and face up to our oppositeness.
4
Viewed from the interindividual perspective, conflict "resolution" does not
involve efforts to come quickly to an agreement that leaves one's current
self-understanding, and the assumptions which support it, unexamined.
Table 1. Three Stages of Adult Development
One can But is subject Principal Principal
objectify.., to... Strengths Limitations
Interpersonal own needs, interpersonal ability to "own"
Stage desires, and relationships consider and interests, etc.
purposes as source for attune to derivative of
defining "own" others' others;
needs, desires, perspectives seemingly
purposes, and and to indecisive,
sense of self coordinate impression-
with others' able, lacking
needs, desires, genuine
and purposes self-agency
Institutional one's own identity; strengths of inability to
Stage relationships "ideology" in prior stages, reflect mean-
and others' form of plus ability to ingfully on
feelings, personal value identify and purposes for
needs, desires, system to assert separate which one's
and purposes which one needs, desires, autonomy is
wishes the and purposes; exercised; con-
world to genuine self- flict resolved
conform agency; stable without
self- sufficient
understanding reflection on
and self- elements of
presentation one's self-
understanding
that tend to
1 produce it
5 4 KEGAN, IN OVER OUR HEADS, supra note 6, at 309-10.
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Inter- own and strengths of
individual others' prior stages,
Stage institutional plus ability to
"ideologies" reflect
critically on
and act
independently
of one's
"ideology ";
conflict viewed
as opportunity
for enhanced
sef-
11 understanding I
Ill. TRANSFORMATIVE CONFLICT INTERVENTION
I suggested earlier that the term "transformative," as currently used in
much of the dispute resolution literature, seems to have at least two
meanings. It sometimes refers to approaches to intervention that seek to
promote mutual understanding among the parties, as opposed to simply
reaching agreement. At other times, it means that and something more. As
indicated above, Bush and Folger believe their approach also supports
disputants' moral growth. 55 Their goal is to create a context in which
conflict is addressed through opportunities for personal development-for
whatever benefit that may have for this and other conflicts in which the
parties, separately or together, may be involved.
We might call the first type of transformation "situational
transformation" and the latter type "developmental transformation."
Situational transformation occurs where a party makes use of pre-existing
perspectives or abilities in a manner that positively influences the present
conflict, for example, by demonstrating empathy for another person's
predicament. Developmental transformation occurs where a party begins to
cultivate, or more securely internalizes, new perspectives and abilities-
perspectives and abilities indicative of a further stage of development.
Accordingly, I propose that an approach to mediation is developmentally
transformative if it tends to support parties' growth from their current
stage(s) of development to the next. An approach to mediation is
55 See BusH & FOLGER, supra note 2, at 24.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
transformative in this sense if it contributes, however much or little, 56 to a
party's growth to a new stage of development-one which provides the
person with new psychological resources for managing conflict (and other
life experiences), as opposed to simply encouraging more productive ways
of using one's present, limited resources, however valuable that may be.
This reformulation of the notion of transformative conflict intervention
suggests that the transformative potential of a given approach to mediation
is not merely a function of process design; it is also a function of a person's
capacity to benefit from the design in developmental terms. A process that
supports developmental transformation for one person may hold no
transformative potential for another. As I try to demonstrate below with
respect to Bush and Folger's model, constructive-developmental theory
suggests that any approach to developmental transformation that does not
adapt itself to the parties' respective developmental resources and
limitations may at best promote the development of some adults, while
providing no developmental benefit to others. And, it may promote the
development of this smaller group of adults no better than other forms of
mediation that have no developmental ambitions.
Assuming a mediator wishes to encourage and support an individual's
development to a new stage of meaning making in which the limitations of
the present stage, with all of its implications for this and other conflicts, are
transcended, how might one go about doing so? What types of third party
assistance are likely to promote developmental transformation? Kegan
likely would respond with a metaphor: the mediator must attempt to
provide a bridge that is "well anchored on either side." 57 Individual growth
is best facilitated by experiences that provide "an ingenious blend of
support and challenge." 58 This occurs when the strengths of one's current
way of making meaning are affirmed at the same time that one is
sympathetically invited-and supported in one's efforts-to encounter and
transcend its limitations.
56 As noted earlier, developmental progress in adulthood typically occurs rather
slowly. A mediation, even one that consists of multiple sessions, is extremely unlikely
to support a complete shift from one developmental stage to the next. As discussed
more fully below, however, both the process design and the mediator's interventions
may provide the types of support that can substantially contribute to an individual's
development. Conflict situations arguably present special opportunities for personal
growth.
57 KEGAN, IN OVER OUR HEADS, supra note 6, at 37.
5 8 Id. at 42.
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Kegan thinks of such simultaneous challenge and support in terms of a
three-part effort involving "confirmation (holding on)," "contradiction
(letting go)," and "continuity (staying put for regeneration)." '5 9 In the
mediation context, confirmation might entail recognizing and affirming that
which seems most at stake for a person involved in the conflict and
responding sympathetically, but unanxiously, to the person's insecurities
about the situation. Contradiction might come in the form of
encouragement to conceive of the conflict, or a particular issue or choice
under consideration, in the way that an adult firmly centered in the next
stage of development might see it. Continuity is about being present as one
reintegrates one's prior self-understanding (now as an object of awareness,
rather than its unperceived governing principle) from the new
developmental vantage point. A developmental transition is not complete
until one is able to have a reasonably cordial relationship with the self-
understanding that was repudiated during the transition.
For instance, in the first example above, the mediator might respond to
Jim's attempt to delegate his decisionmaking authority as follows:
This obviously is a very major decision, Jim. I certainly can
understand your indecision and your desire to have someone else decide
for you., I'll be happy to ask you questions and provide some information
that may be helpful to you as you think through the implications of
Karen's proposal. But, in the end, the decision about whether to agree to
these terms, agree to other terms, or go to court is yours to make.
A response like this one provides small doses of the confirmation,
contradiction, and continuity necessary to support Jim's growth from the
interpersonal stage of development to the institutional stage. It
simultaneously acknowledges the genuineness of Jim's predicament as he
sees it (confirmation), insists upon a self-authoring response
(contradiction), and offers nondirective assistance and support while he
labors to produce a self-authoring response (continuity).
IV. ASSESSING THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF
"TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION"
Is Bush and Folger's approach to mediation likely to promote moral
development? That is, is it well designed to support developmental
transformation, as opposed to situational transformation? Which adults, if
59 See KEGAN, THE EvOLVING SELF, supra note 6, at 118.
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any, might find in Bush and Folger's model an "ingenious mix of challenge
and support" for their ongoing development?
A. The "Transformative Mediation" Process
Bush and Folger distinguish their approach to mediation from three
others that they consider nontransformative, contrasting it sharply, in
particular, against the type of interest-based, or problem-solving, mediation
practiced by many mediators 60 and described in books like Getting to Yes. 61
According to Folger and Bush, the following ten characteristics distinguish
transformative approaches to mediation from nontransformative
approaches: 62 (1) an opening statement that frames the mediator's role and
objectives in terms of empowerment (strengthening of self) and recognition
(responsiveness to others);63 (2) responsibility for the outcome is in the
party's hands; 64 (3) the mediator does not judge the parties' perspectives
and choices; 65 (4) the mediator takes an "optimistic view of the parties'
competence and motives";66 (5) expression of emotion is permitted and
acknowledged; 67 (6) uncertainty and confusion are embraced, and the
parties allowed to explore them; 68 (7) the mediator keeps the parties'
attention focused on their interaction "in the room," and discourages
"'backing up' to a broader view on the identification and solution of the
problem";69 (8) discussion of the past is encouraged; 70 (9) the mediator
recognizes that the conflicts may have an extended life, so that the
intervention is viewed "as one point in a larger sequence of conflict
interaction";71 and (10) a mediation is "successful" if the slightest degree
60 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 2, at 15-16.
61 See ROGER FIsHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WrTHoUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991).
62 See Joseph P. Folger & Robert A. Baruch Bush, Transformative Mediation and
Third-Party Intervention: Ten Hallmarks of a Transformative Approach to Practice, 13
MEDIATION Q. 263, 266-76 (1996).
63 See id. at 266.
64 See id. at 267.
65 See id. at 268.
66 Id. at 269.
67 See id. at 271.
68 See id. at 272.
69 Id. at 273.
70 See id.
71 Id. at 274.
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of recognition or empowerment occurs.72 As indicated earlier, the goal of
their approach-and the reason they call it "transformative"-is the
promotion of individual moral development, a goal which they see as
having benefits for society as a whole.
Bush and Folger believe that moral growth occurs when people
"develop a greater degree of both self-determination and responsiveness to
others," which they refer to as "empowerment" and "recognition,"
respectively. 73 Empowerment occurs when parties "gain clarity about their
goals, resources, options, and preferences" and are supported in their
efforts to make "clear and deliberate decisions." 74 Recognition occurs when
parties "voluntarily choose to become more open, attentive, sympathetic,
and responsive to the situation of the other party, thereby expanding their
perspective to include an appreciation for another's situation." 75 Parties are
encouraged to "consider the other's point of view" with respect to the
conflict, and "relational issues... [are] mine[d] for recognition
opportunities." 76
Transformative mediation is designed to create an environment in
which moments of empowerment and recognition can occur repeatedly.
Reaching settlement is not among the mediator's objectives; indeed, one of
the mediator's goals is attempting not to influence the outcome in any way,
even by predisposing the parties to think there should be an outcome of one
kind or another. 77 The mediator makes an opening statement as the process
begins, stressing the importance of recognition and empowerment, and
indicating that settlement is but one possible outcome and "that mediation
can be worthwhile even if settlement is not reached .... 78
While there is no set structure for the remainder of the session, Bush
and Folger explain that the mediator's moves give rise to a common
pattern. 79 As the parties address each other and the mediator, and as they
deliberate, the mediator continually seizes upon opportunities for
empowerment and recognition. 80 This may take the form, for example, of
72 Id. at 275.
73 Id. at 264.
74Id.
75 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 2, at 89.
76 Id. at 101.
77 See id. at 141-42.
78 Id. at 142.
79 See id. at 192-93.
80 See id. at 193.
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exploring the past in order to surface the parties' respective views of one
another or of inviting a party to consider new ways in which the other's
behavior could be understood.81 When the opportunities for recognition and
empowerment in a given exchange seem to be exhausted, the mediator
attempts to generate further opportunities by redirecting the discussion in a
manner that seems likely to produce them.82 This cyclical process continues
until all such opportunities appear to have been exhausted, at which point
the mediator summarizes any progress that has occurred with respect to
empowerment, recognition, and other matters, and helps the parties
produce a written document or agreement if they wish to do so. 83
B. Is Transformative Mediation Developmentally Transformative?
Bush and Folger's ideal of "compassionate strength" seems to
correspond to Kegan's interindividual stage of development. Compassionate
strength is the hallmark of a worldview they call "relational." 84 They
sharply distinguish their relational worldview from its "organic" and
"individualistic" counterparts,85 which appear to correspond roughly to the
perspectives of adults at the interpersonal and institutional stages,
respectively, in Kegan's model of development. Thus, it seems that Bush
and Folger hope to encourage disputants to grow to a stage of development
that roughly corresponds to Kegan's interindividual stage. If this is so, we
must ask whether their process actually supports growth toward the
interindividual stage of development. If it is capable of doing so, we also
must ask whether all adults can benefit from the process. The answers to
these questions depend upon both the structure of the process and a
participant's ability to harness whatever potential for developmental
transformation it offers.
1. Transformative Mediation and Adults at the Interpersonal
Stage of Development
As we saw earlier, adults at the interpersonal stage of development can
consider and attune themselves to others' perspectives, but they have
81 See id. at 192.
82 See id. at 204.
83 See id. at 200-04.
84 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 2, at 242; Folger & Bush, supra note 6, at 15.
85 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 2, at 245.
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difficulty acting on their own authority. Thus, an adult at the interpersonal
stage may find an appropriate degree of developmental challenge in
transformative mediation to the extent that the mediator's emphasis on
"empowerment" translates into an insistence that the party articulate and
assert his own interests. But, an emphasis on empowerment of this type,
which amounts to a contradiction of the party's present self-understanding,
must be accompanied both by confirmation of the party's predicament as
she sees it and by some assurance of continuity between what the party
presently values and the values implicit in the new perspective that the
party is asked to embrace. Mere insistence on self-authoring behavior is
unlikely to present a bridge secure enough for the party to consider
crossing.
On the other hand, transformative mediation's emphasis on
"recognition" raises the rather complicated issue of whether the ongoing
development of an adult at the interpersonal stage is truly supported by the
type of perspective-taking and accommodation that Bush and Folger
advocate. Because an adult at this stage of development is "made up" at
any given moment by her relationships, and because those relationships
which exist within the context of presently shared space may have special,
if temporary, influence, the adult at this stage of development has little
ability to construct a perspective that is his "own" over and apart from
others' perspectives. This presents the possibility that, so far as the
development of an adult at the interpersonal stage is concerned,
transformative mediation's dual emphasis on empowerment and recognition
may be operating at cross purposes.
As discussed more fully below, the institutional stage of development
can be experienced in a way that emphasizes connection and responsiveness
to others. 86 It does not, as Bush and Folger seem to be aware, necessarily
involve highly individualistic behavior or decisions. Perhaps ideally, a
party at the interpersonal stage of development would experience
transformative mediation as an invitation to transition toward an other-
responsive form of institutionalism. An invitation of this type might provide
the sense of continuity needed to support the party's development: one who
is shown the possibility of an independence that affirms one's connections
with others may indeed see in it a bridge secure enough to consider
crossing.
The mediator moves and responses advocated by Bush and Folger,
however, arguably risk amplification of the confusion and ambivalence
86 See KEGAN, IN OVER OUR HEADS, supra note 6, at 221-22.
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already experienced by an adult at the interpersonal stage of development.
A mediator wishing to encourage a party's development from the
interpersonal to the institutional stage would be wise to emphasize the
empowerment side of Bush and Folger's empowerment-recognition
equation, in effect co-opting the recognition side and placing it in the
service of empowerment. In other words, creating opportunities for mutual
"recognition" may be useful primarily as a way of providing confirmation
of the party's present way of making meaning for the purpose of making
self-authoring behavior seem less risky. Recognition might then mean
seeing another party as a distinct individual with her own needs and
concerns-needs and concerns that one cares about, at least in part, because
their satisfaction may be a prerequisite to satisfaction of one's own distinct
needs and concerns. This is precisely the definition of "recognition" that
Bush and Folger resist.
An effective invitation to transition from the interpersonal stage to the
institutional stage must encourage a type of relatedness that is qualitatively
different from the over identified mutuality which is characteristic of the
interpersonal stage. For parties at the interpersonal stage of development,
"transformation" is about the development of a distinctive identity. This
goal may not be well served by the type of recognition that Bush and
Folger advocate, which involves a "letting go-however briefly or
partially-of one's focus on self and becoming interested in the perspective
of the other party as such, concerned about the situation of the other as a
fellow human being, not as an instrument for fulfilling one's own needs." 87
This type of "recognition" encourages a form of relatedness which, to
borrow a phrase from Kegan, may be "over the heads" of adults
transitioning away from the interpersonal stage of development. It actually
may be counterproductive to the development of these adults. One must be
able to focus genuinely on oneself before one can "let go" of that focus;
focusing on oneself in the "individualist" sense of which Bush and Folger
ultimately disapprove is precisely what the adult at the interpersonal cannot
yet do.
The type of relatedness that needs to be encouraged as one transitions
from the interpersonal stage of development is a relatedness which, to a
significant degree, subordinates itself to the individual's emerging sense of
himself as a distinct person. This is not to say that a mediator whose
objectives include developmental transformation should not encourage
genuine demonstrations of mutual understanding. A mediator merely should
87 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 2, at 97.
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recognize that for a party who is just beginning to transition away from the
interpersonal stage of development, there is a fine and often porous line
between taking another's perspective and sacrificing one's own interests.
From the mediator's perspective, this means that the type of
"recognition" that one asks of a party at the interpersonal stage of
development must not invite the party too far into the other's experience; it
must take care to emphasize the parties' distinctiveness at the same time
that it invites a party at the interpersonal stage of development to consider
the other's perspective. At most, the mediator should invite a party at the
interpersonal stage of development to consider and demonstrate an
understanding of the ways others might see things, all the while reinforcing
the parties' distinctiveness. In the context of a mediation between two
neighbors-one of whom, Simon, the mediator believes is viewing the
conflict through the lens of interpersonalism-an appropriate (if somewhat
exaggerated) mediator move encouraging recognition might go as follows:
Simon, you obvioisly are not in Jenny's shoes. As we can see, you
have your own concerns and objectives, some of which Jenny shares, but
some of which she doesn't. That's normal. The closest of friends
obviously can have differences that don't threaten their relationship, so
there's no reason why the same shouldn't be true of neighbors. Regardless
of what the two of you decide about the fence, it's important that youboth
express whatever seems most important to you in relation to this dispute.
If the two of you decide you want to settle the dispute, any agreement
obviously also must address each of your most important concerns and
objectives. Jenny says she was expecting a different kind of fence based
on the discussion you had before it was built. I don't want you to lose
sight of your own recollection of that discussion and your opinion about
what it meant, but perhaps you can try to imagine and describe how the
conversation might have looked from Jenny's perspective.
In sum, if a mediator wishes to support the development of a party at
the interpersonal stage of development, moves and responses geared toward
producing moments of recognition also should reinforce the parties'
separateness. They should contain an "empowering" subtext. Though they
need not totally discourage other-responsiveness, empowerment should be
emphasized over recognition.
Two important points about the constructive-developmental perspective
on adult development-alone and in relation to Bush and Folger's model of
mediation-are implicit in the discussion so far. First, developmental stages
cannot be skipped. As I indicated earlier, Folger and Bush's vision of full
maturity seems to correspond to Kegan's interindividual stage of
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development. Its hallmarks are forms of "empowerment" and
"recognition"-and, most significantly, a balance between them-of which
adults at the interpersonal and institutional stages of development are not
yet capable. Research done by Kegan and his colleagues suggests that
adoption of Bush and Folger's "relational" worldview-or their
"individualist" worldview, for that matter-is not merely a matter of
choice, as Folger and Bush seem to believe. 88 Before a party at the
interpersonal stage of development can provide the form of recognition
Bush and Folger advocate, he first must be able to exercise the form of
empowerment they advocate. In other words, one needs to develop the first
muscle sufficiently before one can fully exercise the second. Once again,
this does not mean that the party at the interpersonal stage should not be
encouraged to demonstrate what we might call "recognition." It simply
means that the form of recognition offered must be somewhat different than
that which Bush and Folger seem to encourage. When it comes to
developmentally-supportive empowerment and recognition, one size does
not fit all. Mediator moves and responses that provide developmental
support to one party may provide no support to another, or they actually
may confound development.
Second, it follows that genuine development is occurring when an adult
transitions from the interpersonal stage to the institutional stage, even
though an adult at the institutional stage does not yet view conflict or other
social interaction in a way that is wholly consistent with Bush and Folger's
relational worldview.
2. Transformative Mediation and Adults at the Institutional Stage
of Development
The dual purposes of empowerment and recognition present a different
challenge for the mediator who wishes to foster the development of an adult
88 See Folger & Bush, supra note 62, at 267-68. It arguably is possible for an
individual at the interpersonal stage of development to be socialized to speak and act in
ways that bear some resemblance to Bush and Folger's relational worldview (or their
"individualist" worldview, for that matter), but such behavior would not be the product
of an authentic internalization of that perspective. In other words, it would not be a
developmental achievement. Nor could this person consistently enact a relational (or
individualist) worldview. Likewise, it is arguably possible for an individual at the
institutional stage of development to speak and act in ways that bear some resemblance
to Bush and Folger's relational worldview, but, once again, this behavior would not be
the product of an authentic internalization of that perspective. She would be unable to
embody and consistently and congruently enact the "relational" perspective.
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at the institutional stage. The adult at this stage of development is in less
need of empowerment in the sense in which that term is used by Bush and
Folger. To be sure, many of the mediator moves that Bush and Folger
classify as empowerment may be quite helpful to an adult at the institutional
stage-for example, assisting in the organization and analysis of issues,
helping identify resources in the party's possession that might contribute to
a settlement, and helping one assess the strengths and weaknesses of one's
case89 (all of which, by the way, many "problem-solving" mediators also
regularly do). But, such assistance seems to have more of an administrative
quality than a "self-strengthening" quality when viewed from the
perspective of an adult at the institutional stage of development. The
empowerment events identified by Bush and Folger-for example,
realization of what matters most to oneself and why, how such concerns are
implicated in the present conflict, and making conscious decisions for
oneself 90-already are within the grasp of these adults. These most often
are not "transformative" moments in a developmental sense.
Transformative mediation nonetheless may help facilitate the transition
from the institutional order to the interindividual order if the mediator's
emphasis on recognition invites an adult at the institutional stage of
development not only to a better understanding of another's perspective,
but to an expanded understanding of oneself. As we have seen, an adult at
the institutional stage of development already is quite capable of seeing a
situation from another's point of view without losing possession of one's
own perspective-even if one is resistant to doing so as a mediation session
begins. One can take a perspective on another's experience and understand,
for example, why the other might experience as unsatisfactory something
which, to one's own way of thinking, is quite agreeable. Moments of
recognition like this undeniably may be significant for one or both parties,
for the relationship between the parties, and perhaps even, as Bush and
Folger contend, for society as a whole. And, as is Bush and Folger's hope,
the party providing the recognition may even realize "that, beyond
possessing the capacity to consider and acknowledge the other's situation,
he has the actual desire to do so." 91
Perspective change such as this seems generally positive, and I believe
it has potentially important moral value., Yet, one must ask whether it truly
is indicative of moral development; that is, whether it is evidence of
89 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 2, at 85-89.
90 See id.
91 Id. at 90.
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movement toward an entirely new vantage point from which selfhood and
the nature of the relationships between selves are constructed, as opposed to
the exercise of one's existing capacities in a more compassionate way. The
question is an important one, because, as we saw earlier, adults at the
institutional stage of development, even at their conflictual best, still have
great difficulty resolving many conflicts, particularly where core identity
issues are involved. Development beyond the institutional stage requires
more than reciprocal appreciation of "your perspective" and "my
perspective." In fact, the very notion that one has a single, stable
perspective or unitary collection of interests must be surrendered as one
develops beyond the institutional stage.
It may be possible for a mediator to promote a form of recognition that
invites an adult at the institutional stage of development not only to desire
to see how another sees things, but to begin to glimpse the internal diversity
within oneself. In a paradoxical sense, recognition at the interindividual
stage of development is as much about oneself as it is about others. For the
party at the institutional stage, development occurs to the extent that one
returns from inquiry into another's perspective saying, in effect, "I now see
parts of myself that I've never seen. I recognize features of myself that
previously were hidden or denied."
In response to Susan's statement to her business partner, Mike, in the
example above, 92 the mediator might ask:
Susan, you just said you understand how Mike sees things. Is there
any part of you that sees things the same way, or perhaps even in some
way or ways that are different than either of the perspectives that the two
of you have expressed so far? If so, what are the implications of this
multiplicity of perspectives for how you understand yourself, Mike, and
the relations between you, including this conflict?
Unless a mediator encourages this type of "recognition" from parties at the
institutional stage of development-most likely through questions and
moves that would seem a bit strange to some mediators and parties, and
perhaps also inappropriately close to psychotherapy to some-I doubt
whether "transformative mediation" (as defined by Bush and Folger) holds
much developmental potential for these individuals. Where empowerment
needed to be emphasized when dealing with a party at the interpersonal
stage of development, recognition of the special sort just described must be
emphasized by a mediator who wishes to support the development of an
92 See example discussed in Part II.A.2, supra, of this Article.
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adult from the institutional to the interindividual stage. Some attention to
empowerment (in the sense of a continued recognition of the parties'
distinct identities) is necessary to provide confirmation of the party's
current way of making meaning about herself in relation to others, but the
focus this time must be upon a special brand of what Bush and Folger
might still wish to call "recognition."
V. DEVELOPMENTAL TRANSFORMATION AND PROBLEM SOLVING
Interestingly, the problem-solving orientation within mediation that
Bush and Folger critique and characterize as nontransformative arguably
supports a developmental transformation equally well for adults at or
transitioning from the interpersonal stage of development. Mediators with a
facilitative, nondirective, problem-solving orientation encourage parties to
identify and articulate their own interests, 93 which is a form of
"empowerment" that supports the development of adults at the
interpersonal stage. Many problem solving mediators also encourage parties
to demonstrate empathy for each other. At least some of them conceive of
the empathy in a way that may be somewhat less likely than Bush and
Folger's approach to work against the ongoing development of a party
transitioning to, but not yet fully settled in, the institutional stage of
development. 94
Folger and Bush claim that "the self-referential approach to interests
that lies at the heart of the problem-solving orientation is inconsistent with
the other-directed nature recognition." 95 As we have seen, however, a form
of recognition that also encourages self-reference and assertion of one's
own interests actually holds more transformative potential than the type of
recognition advocated by Bush and Folger for the many adults who are at
the interpersonal stage of development (or transitioning from it to the
institutional stage). Contrary to Bush and Folger's claims about problem-
solving mediation's inability to support parties' moral development, 96 some
forms of skillfully practiced problem-solving mediation may promote the
93 See, e.g., FISHER ET AL., supra note 61, at 40-55; Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31
UCLA L. REv. 754, 804-07 (1984).
94 See, e.g., Robert Mnookin et al., The Tension Between Empathy and
Assertiveness, 12 NEGOTATION J. 217, 219-20 (1996).
95 Folger & Bush, supra note 6, at 25 n.6.
96 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 2, at 81.
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development of adults at the interpersonal stage of development as well as,
or perhaps even better than, Bush and Folger's model.
It appears, however, that neither Bush and Folger's approach nor the
type of problem-solving mediation just described is particularly well-
designed to provide developmental support to adults at (or transitioning
from) the institutional stage of development. Bush and Folger's model
arguably is intended to support adults at precisely this phase in their
development. 97 As indicated above, Bush and Folger's model probably
could be modified to provide developmental support to these parties. 98
Likewise, a problem-solving approach to mediation could be practiced in a
way that would provide similar developmental support.
As explained above, from a constructive-developmental perspective, the
key to transformation-in the sense of moral development-is the
experience of contradiction and confirmation, of challenge and support. For
the party transitioning from the interpersonal to the institutional stage of
development, the requirements of problem solving-identifying and
asserting one's needs, concerns, and interests, for example, and imaging,
evaluating, and selecting among options designed to satisfy them-address
the "challenge dimension" of this equation. For the party transitioning from
the institutional stage to the interindividual stage, these activities provide
confirmation of one's present way of making meaning. They may provide a
rationale for participating in the process and a platform from which one
confronts the challenges posed by a mediator's moves designed to invite a
shift away from an institutional understanding of oneself, others, and the
nature of conflict. Thus, even for a transformative mediator, problem
solving may play a critical role for those at or transitioning away from the
two most common stages of adult development. The goals and techniques
of problem solving are not necessarily at odds with those of transformation.
Bush and Folger are of course right to suggest that moral development
is unlikely to occur to the extent that problem solving means that the
mediator tells the parties how to settle their dispute. Naturally, the parties
must do the work. And, a mediator who wishes to support the development
of parties at (or transitioning away from) the institutional stage of
development also must not let the parties themselves rush to a "quick fix"
solution, because-to borrow Kegan's phrase-the transition from the
institutional to the interindividual stage to some extent involves letting our
problems "solve us." Generally speaking, however, a process that
97 See the discussion of Bush and Folger's relational worldview, supra Part III.
98 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
[Vol. 15:1 1999]
HOW TRANSFORMATIVE IS TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION?
encourages parties to generate options, evaluate and select among them,
and make commitments to one another may have transformative potential
for many parties. It is simply wrong to suggest, as do Bush and Folger, that
approaches to mediation that involve problem solving cannot contribute to a
party's moral development.
Just as mediators interested in moral development may make productive
use of problem solving approaches to mediation, mediators who wish to
facilitate party problem solving may benefit from acquaintance with the
dynamics of individual development. A mediator equipped to respond to the
parties' meaning making efforts within a mediation arguably is better able
to help them identify and articulate developmentally influenced needs,
fears, concerns, and interests, understand the dilemmas inherent in the
choices with which they are faced, appreciate and work through relational
dimensions of the conflict, make use of the strengths of their current
developmental capacities, and overcome challenges presented by current
developmental limitations.
VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
If one considers it appropriate to relate to parties in ways that tend to
support their ongoing development, whether as a primary purpose of the
mediation or as an aid to problem solving, a range of difficult practical
issues must be addressed. Two such issues are developmental stage
assessment, on the one hand, and dealing with developmentally diverse
parties on the other.
A. Developmental Stage Assessment
Mediators interested in responding to parties in ways that tend to
support their development must be able to recognize developmental stage
differences-a task that becomes more complicated when parties are
transitioning between stages, as many adults are. While many serious
students of constructive-developmental psychology do become proficient in
making reasonably accurate, informal, tentative assessments of others'
ways of making meaning, formal assessments typically require a specialized
interview or completion of a special questionnaire, the administration of
which requires specialized training. While an informal assessment of a
party's location on the developmental continuum may be sufficient for
purposes of making judgments about the types of moves and responses that
might lend support to a party's ongoing process of development, mediators
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wishing to integrate the constructive-developmental perspective into their
practice must be trained to make such judgments. It probably is safe to say
that few mediators presently have such training.
B. Developmentally Diverse Parties
Assuming one had the requisite training and skills to integrate
principles of constructive-developmental psychology into one's mediation
practice, conducting a mediation in a manner designed-perhaps among
other things-to support the parties' development might not be very
difficult, assuming the parties are at roughly the same point on the
developmental continuum. However, whenever parties to a mediation are at
(or transitioning between) different developmental stages, as must often be
the case, efforts to support their development become more complicated.
As we have seen, parties transitioning from the interpersonal stage to the
institutional stage ought to be encouraged to practice a different sort of
recognition than those transitioning from the institutional to the
interindividual stage.
Efforts to employ two different notions of recognition in a single
mediation session are risky, because different treatment of the parties, if
perceived, may give rise to questions about the mediator's impartiality.
They may also send mixed messages that could be difficult or impossible
for some parties to untangle. A mediator might have to be transparent99
about his party-specific developmental purposes and desired impacts in
response to such questions.' 00 If a mediator were fully transparent about
her intentions and desired impacts, however-explaining, for example, that
the purpose of a particular question is to promote party A's moral
99 See Michael Moffitt, Casting Light on the Black Box of Mediation: Should
Mediators Make Their Conduct More Transparent?, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1,
2-3 (1997).
100 We also must ask whether a "transformative" mediator's developmental
purposes should be disclosed with at least some minimal degree of transparency at the
beginning of the process for the purpose of obtaining the parties' informed consent to
participation, particularly if the mediator does not intend to introduce the prospect of
and facilitate party problem solving. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent
in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 775, 819-27 (1999) (developing the notion of "participation consent"
and advocating the disclosure of the "the nature and purposes of the mediation process,
the mediator's role, and the norms that will govern the process"). It probably is fair to
say that most parties agree to mediation with the expectation that its primary purpose is
problem solving rather than active support of their moral development.
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development and that the purpose of another, obviously different, sort of
question is to try to support party B's development to the stage presently
occupied by party A-many parties probably would object to the entire
process. While this extreme level of transparency may not be desirable or
appropriate, it is hard to imagine how a mediator who adheres strictly to
Bush and Folger's model could respond to parties' concerns in a way that
would be truthful and that also would inspire continued trust in the process.
Should one party or the other object to the process on the basis of different
treatment, perhaps the best a mediator could do is explain that she believes
the parties have different perspectives regarding one another and the
conflict, and that she is doing her best to respond in ways that are
responsive to each perspective.
VII. CONCLUSION
Where transformative mediation connotes an approach to practice that
seeks to encourage self-determination and to promote mutual understanding
and genuine demonstrations of empathy, the idea of "transformation" is
relatively unproblematic. If a mediator wishes to promote transformation in
'the sense of individual moral development, however, the matter becomes
much more complicated. Transformation of this more ambitious type must
take into account not only the design of a particular process, but
participants' capacity to meet its developmental demands. As presently
constructed, Bush and Folger's model of mediation appears at best to hold
transformative potential for a fraction of all adults, and it probably does so
no more effectively than a common approach to problem solving mediation
that they criticize.
Contrary to Bush and Folger's claims that problem solving and
developmentally transformative purposes cannot cross-fertilize, I believe
they often are supportive of one another. Mediators who view themselves
as problem solvers face many problems that cannot be solved without
process designs, and mediator moves and responses within them, which
(perhaps unintentionally) challenge parties to overcome their developmental
limitations and provide them with support as they attempt to do so.
Similarly, mediators who view themselves as agents of individual moral
development will contribute to the growth of few parties, if any, without a
willingness to encourage and facilitate party problem solving where
necessary to provide the challenge and support that produces such growth.
Whatever the limits of mediation may be-whether for problem
solving, support of individual moral development, promotion of social or
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political change, or other purposes currently debated and yet to be
imagined-it seems unlikely that they will be defined by rigid distinctions
between ideological orientations to practice.
